



It seems perfectly obvious that we all very frequently have thoughts
that are directed upon or are about particular objects in the external
world, including other persons as well as a vast number of types of
ordinary physical thing. But the problem of what makes our thoughts
and other cognitive attitudes about particular objects is extremely diﬃ-
cult. The problem received much attention from many skilled philoso-
phers from the 1960s until the mid-1980s. But since then, the problem
has received scant attention, even though I think no general consensus
had been achieved regarding the form that a correct solution should
take.1
I would like to return to this problem here. My aim in this paper
will be the limited one of motivating and defending my view that there
are thoughts about objects that are based on description, where an
object is thought about in such cases simply by virtue of the object’s
unique satisfaction of the description in question. There are of course
other ways in which thoughts can be about objects. One can have
thoughts about objects of which one is directly aware, including oneself
and one’s own mental acts, states, and experiences. And one can have
thoughts about objects on the basis of one’s perception of the objects
in sense experience. In such cases, in my view, one need not possess
any descriptive information that is true of the objects thought about, in
1 To be sure, there has been much valuable work during this period on both the
semantics of singular terms and the nature of thought contents and their ascription,
including for example the work by Neale (1990), Richard (1990), Recanati (1993)
and Soames (2002). But none of this work speciﬁcally addresses the problem of
what makes thoughts about objects. And when the topic has been mentioned at all,
the tendency has been to just assume that some sort of unexplained causal relation
will solve the problem. (See for instance Recanati 1993, p. 112.) But this tendency
represents no real advance beyond the original suggestions of a causal theory of
mental reference by such philosophers as Kaplan (1969), Donnellan (1970, 1977)
and Evans (1973). I will discuss causal views below in section 2.
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order to think about them. But in situations in which a person is nei-
ther directly nor perceptually aware of an object, the person’s thought
is about that object, at least typically, and perhaps always, because the
object uniquely satisﬁes the description or descriptions on which the
thinker’s mental act of reference is based.
My conception of the way that mental reference is determined by
description is to be understood on analogy with the semantic phenome-
non of reference-ﬁxing by description, which was ﬁrst clearly explained
by Kripke (1972). This feature of my view serves to distinguish it from
another, earlier form of description theory that I will call ‘the Fregean
view.’ The primary diﬀerence between the two views concerns the logi-
cal form of the propositional contents of thoughts about objects. On
the Fregean view, these contents are purely descriptive in nature, being
of the form ‘The F is G.’ On my view, by contrast, the contents of
thoughts about objects are always Russellian singular propositions
which have the objects thought about as constituents.
Below I will explain and argue for my description theory of mental
reference. I will also defend my theory against the most serious objec-
tion it faces, an objection that was raised by Donnellan (1977).
1. The Fregean View
In the 1960s, the problem of what makes thoughts and other cognitive
attitudes about objects began to receive close attention, due largely to
the seminal work of W. V. Quine on the de re ⁄de dicto distinction, espe-
cially in his 1956 paper ‘‘Quantiﬁers and Propositional Attitudes.’’ In
that paper, Quine emphasized a distinction that holds between two kinds
of belief ascriptions that contain singular terms like deﬁnite descriptions:
(1) Ralph believes that the man in the brown hat is a spy.
(2) Ralph believes of (or about) the man in the brown hat that he
is a spy.2
Quine calls ascriptions like (1) ‘notional.’ They are also commonly
called ‘de dicto’ since they explicitly ascribe a speciﬁc propositional con-
tent (a dictum) to Ralph’s beliefs. By contrast, Quine calls ascriptions
like (2) ‘relational.’ Such ascriptions are also called ‘de re,’ because they
ascribe a mental relation between the believer and the object (or res)
that his or her belief is about.
2 The distinction between (1) and (2) corresponds to the distinction which Russell
(1905) had made between secondary and primary occurrences of deﬁnite descrip-
tions.
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Given Quine’s way of explaining the de re ⁄de dicto distinction, it is
plausible to suppose that de dicto ascriptions fully characterize beliefs
and other attitudes in terms of their (whole) propositional contents,
while de re ascriptions only partially characterize a belief as being about
a given object (the man in the brown hat, say) and as having a given
predicative content (being a spy, say). This led many philosophers to
infer that de re ascriptions could be deﬁned in terms of de dicto ascrip-
tions, and thus to believe that we could account for what makes
thoughts about objects (what makes de re ascriptions true) by appealing
in part to the thoughts’ having certain kinds of propositional contents
(appealing to what makes de dicto ascriptions true).
This way of looking at the de re ⁄de dicto distinction led to a number
of attempts to give what I will call ‘Fregean’ accounts of what makes
thoughts about objects. Such accounts were defended by many promi-
nent philosophers from the 1950s into the 1970s, including Kaplan
(1969), Sellars (1969), Sosa (1970), Chisholm (1976b) and Castan˜eda
(1967, 1972). Even Quine himself had assumed something like a Fre-
gean view in his (1956), where he said that a de dicto ascription like (1)
logically implies a de re ascription like (2) by a form of exportation
(p. 188). These Fregean accounts held that thoughts are either always
or often about particular objects by virtue of the thoughts’ involving
Fregean descriptive senses, modes of presentation, or individual con-
cepts which are satisﬁed by the objects in question. There perhaps was
no general agreement as to whether Fregean senses are always of the
descriptive sort expressed by deﬁnite descriptions. After all, it surely
seems that a ﬁrst person thought about oneself need not be based on
any description. (See Sosa 1969, p. 69.) So perhaps one’s ﬁrst person
thoughts about oneself are via special Fregean non-descriptive self-con-
cepts. (See for instance Chisholm 1976a, Chapter One.)
But there was general agreement among many of the defenders of
the Fregean view that having a thought involving a descriptive sense
was at least suﬃcient for the thought’s being of or about the object that
uniquely satisﬁes the sense.3 So I will take the Fregean view to be com-
mit-ted at a minimum to the following principle:
The Liberal Theory of Aboutness (LTA)
Necessarily, for any person x, object y, and property G, if
there is a property F such that (i) y = the F, (ii) x believes
that the F is G, and (iii) the proposition that the F is G entails
that the F exists, then x believes of or about y that y is G.
3 With Kaplan (1969) being a notable exception. See below.
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I have stated (LTA) in terms of belief, but defenders of the Fregean
view would have endorsed a similar principle for all other cognitive
attitudes, including thought, knowledge, intention, and desire. I call
this principle the ‘Liberal Theory of Aboutness,’ since the principle
makes it relatively easy to have beliefs that are about objects.
(Chisholm (1976b) similarly called such views ‘latitudinarian.’)
Though it was widely endorsed, a serious defect was found in the
Fregean view at about the same time as it was ﬁrst proposed. Sleigh
(1967, p. 28) gave the following counterexample, which applies to
(LTA).4 Suppose that Tom knows that there are spies, and also knows
that in any non-empty set of human beings, one is older than any
other. Using a modicum of logic, Tom then deduces from what he
knows that the oldest spy is a spy. So we have
(3) Tom knows that the oldest spy is a spy.
But since knowledge that p implies that p is true, it also follows from
(3) that
(4) The oldest spy exists.
And then, by the principle for knowledge analogous to (LTA) it
follows that
(5) There is someone y, namely the oldest spy, such that Tom
knows of y that y is a spy.
But it certainly seems absurd to suppose that Tom could come to have
knowledge regarding some particular person to the effect that that per-
son is a spy, merely by knowing that one among the spies is oldest.
Thus Sleigh provided a powerful counterexample to the principle for
knowledge analogous to (LTA). Of course a similar counterexample
4 Sleigh actually directed his counterexample against Quine’s assumption that a
certain principle of ‘‘exportation,’’ which in eﬀect is the principle (LTA), is valid.
(Quine 1956, p. 188.) Sleigh gave credit to Hintikka (1962, pp. 141–44) for the type
of example he used. But Hintikka had used his similar example to argue for a quite
diﬀerent conclusion, and in fact Sleigh later showed (1968, pp. 396–98) that
Hintikka’s argument is unsound (as Sosa 1969, p. 68 also showed). Somewhat later,
both Kaplan (1969, p. 220) and Sosa (1969, p. 71) gave counterexamples to Quine’s
principle of exportation that were substantially the same as Sleigh’s example.
(Though Sosa’s counterexample was directed against Sellars’s (1969) version of the
Fregean view.) Quine quickly capitulated, agreeing (after input from Kripke) that
Sleigh had shown that his principle of exportation is false (Quine 1969, pp. 337–38,
341–42). In fairness to Quine, we should note (as Quine did, 1969, p. 341) that he
‘‘luckily made no use’’ of his principle of exportation in his (1956).
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applies to (LTA) itself, merely by replacing ‘knows’ by ‘believes’ in (3)-
(5). Thus the Fregean view certainly seems false.
But what exactly is the defect in the Fregean view that allows it to
fall prey to counter-examples like Sleigh’s? Another example similar to
Sleigh’s may help to answer this question. Suppose that in 2003, before
the candidates for the 2004 U.S. presidential election have been chosen,
Jones becomes convinced that due to the clearly demonstrated incom-
petence of the Republican Bush administration, the winner of the 2004
election will be the Democratic candidate, whoever that may turn out
to be. Thus we have
(6) Jones believes that the winner of the 2004 election will be the
Democratic candidate.
Since of course Bush will in fact be the winner of the election, it fol-
lows from (6) by (LTA) that
(7) Jones believes of Bush that he will be the Democratic candidate
But (7) of course seems quite false, since Jones already knows of Bush
that he is a Republican, and so he surely would have no belief of the
sort that (7) ascribes to him.
The moral of both this and Sleigh’s example would seem to be that
de dicto ascriptions like (3) and (6) do not ascribe cognitive states that
are about the referents (if any) of the imbedded small-scope descrip-
tions. The explanation of this fact would in turn seem to be provided
by Russell’s theory of descriptions, on which the propositional contents
expressed by descriptive sentences like those imbedded in (3) and (6)
are general, quantiﬁed propositions that are not themselves about any
particular objects. (See for instance Russell 1905.)5
Russell himself seems to have held that that in order to have a
thought that is really about an object, one’s thought must have a con-
tent that is expressible by use of what Russell called a ‘logically proper
name,’ or by what I shall call a ‘genuine term.’ (See for instance
Russell 1912, p. 53.) A genuine term is a singular term whose sole
semantic contribution to the propositions expressed by sentences con-
taining the term is simply the term’s referent. A sentence containing a
genuine term thus expresses a proposition that is a function of the
term’s referent, if it has one. Or as Russell put it, the proposition will
have the term’s referent ‘as a constituent.’ Propositions of this sort are
commonly called ‘singular propositions.’
5 For a persuasive and thorough defense of Russell’s theory, see Neale 1990.
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From a Russellian perspective, the Fregean view’s mistake is simply
a mistake about logical form.6 To have a thought about a particular
object, it is not suﬃcient for the thought’s content to be a general
proposition expressed by use of a deﬁnite description that is uniquely
satisﬁed by the object. Rather the thought’s content must be a singular
proposition that itself is about the object in question. This is the diag-
nosis of the Fregean view’s mistake that I endorse.
2. The Causal Theory
However, there has been another competing diagnosis which has held
center-stage since the problem with the Fregean view was ﬁrst discov-
ered. This competing diagnosis is based on another natural reaction to
Sleigh’s counterexample, which is to infer that, in order to have
thoughts that are really about a given object x, one must bear a
‘‘closer’’ or ‘‘stronger’’ relation to x than is provided merely by think-
ing something of the form ‘The F is G’ where x happens to be the F.
This was Kaplan’s reaction in his 1969 paper ‘‘Quantifying In,’’ where
he proposed substantially the same counterexample to (LTA) as Sleigh
had given (Kaplan 1969, p. 220). Kaplan expressed this reaction by
suggesting that, in addition to having a descriptively ‘‘vivid’’ mode of
referring that denotes a given object of belief, the believer must in some
sense also be en rapport with the object in question. And in order for a
person to be suﬃciently en rapport with an object to have beliefs about
it, he said, the person must have a mode of referring to that object that
is somehow genetically, or causally, based on the object itself (1969, pp.
225–27).7 Kaplan’s causal requirement was subsequently endorsed and
developed by such philosophers as Evans (1973), Devitt (1974, 1981),
Donnellan (1977), Boo¨r and Lycan (1986) and McKay (1984, 1994).
The idea is, I believe, still widely endorsed today. (See for instance
Perry 2001, pp. 50–52.)
However, after over three decades, Kaplan’s idea has failed to bear
fruit. No clear, speciﬁc account or explanation of the alleged relevant
causal relation has ever been stated or suggested. In fact, the idea itself
is not just obscure but is also implausible in various ways. First, it can-
not be a requirement that is demanded by our concept of having an
object in mind, or of having a thought that is about an object, that the
object be causally related to the thought. For instance, as Kim (1977,
p. 618) pointed out, it makes little sense to suppose that when we think
6 For a clear and compelling expression of the Russellian perspective, see Boo¨r and
Lycan 1986, p. 125.
7 In a footnote (note 24, p. 241), Kaplan credits the insights of Saul Kripke and
Charles Chastain for his emphasis on genetic factors.
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about objects of direct awareness or acquaintance, such as ourselves or
our own mental states, acts, or experiences, our thoughts are about
these objects by virtue of some causal relation between our thoughts
and these objects of which we are directly aware. Also, as Kim points
out, it does not violate our concept of mental aboutness to suppose
that we can have thoughts about abstract objects such as numbers, sets,
properties, relations, and word-types. But again, these are not things to
which our thoughts could bear any causal relations.8
Thus a causal relation can only be a necessary condition of mental
reference to objects other than objects of acquaintance and abstract
objects. But even if the causal view is restricted to thoughts about
physical objects in the external world, the view is too strong. As Sosa
(1970) pointed out shortly after Kaplan ﬁrst made his suggestion, if the
causal requirement were correct, then no one could ever have beliefs,
or be in any other mental states, that are about objects that do not yet
exist, but will exist in the future. Yet surely this consequence conﬂicts
with common sense. As Sosa says: ‘‘Can’t it be true that there is to be
a meeting that I believe will be fruitless? Can’t there be a house which,
even when the plans were being drawn, I hoped would please us? And
so on.’’ (1970, p. 889.)
There are also cases where it is clear that a person has a thought
about a presently existing object, even though the object has no role in
the genesis of the thought. For instance, Blackburn (1984, p. 339) gave
the following nice example of this:
. . . suppose the wife learns that the husband often takes out and
adores a handkerchief with traces of the mistress upon it. So she
buys a new one, identical except for the marks and substitutes it.
She says as she gloatingly learns of his strangled gasp of surprise
when he took it out: ‘He expected it to have lipstick marks on it!’
She attributes an expectation to the husband relating him de re to
the substitute handkerchief. But this had no causal inﬂuence on the
husband’s expectation at all.
Cases of this sort, as well as others,9 make it clear, I think, that there is
no type of object such that it is a necessary condition of our having
thoughts about objects of that type that the objects must bear some
special sort of causal relation to the thoughts in question.
Now there could be another, weaker, sort of causal view of thought
about objects on which some particular sort of causal relation, while
8 I raised a similar diﬃculty for Devitt’s (1981) causal theory of having an object in
mind in my (1983), p. 113.
9 See McKinsey 1976a, pp. 129–30.
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not a necessary condition of mental reference, at least provides one
way, among others, of thinking about physical objects. One obvious
candidate for such a causal relation is the particular sort that is
involved in perception, and I would not deny that in such cases, causa-
tion plays a role in determining mental reference. But most causal theo-
rists have also believed that even thoughts about objects of which the
thinker is not perceptually aware are often determined to be about
those objects by virtue of some special causal relation. So again, per-
haps such a causal relation could provide one way (among others) of
thinking about objects of which the thinker is neither directly nor per-
ceptually aware. But in the absence of any clear account, or really any
account at all, of such a causal relation, it is diﬃcult to evaluate this
suggestion.10
Some philosophers may have been persuaded that at least there must
be some such causal relation that can determine mental reference, by
Donnellan’s (1970) and Kripke’s (1972) arguments to the eﬀect that
speakers can use proper names to refer to objects that uniquely satisfy
none of the descriptions that speakers associate with the names. (See
for instance Kripke’s famous Go¨del ⁄Schmidt case, 1972, p. 294.) Since
it seems in such cases that the speakers would be expressing thoughts
about the names’ referents, even though these referents are not deter-
mined by description, it might also seem likely that some causal rela-
tion is determining what the thoughts are about. However, I showed in
earlier work that these arguments of Donnellan and Kripke simply fail
to show that the referents of the names in their cases would uniquely
satisfy none of the relevant associated descriptions. (See McKinsey,
1976a, 1978a, 1978b, 1981, and 1984. See also Boo¨r 1972, Loar 1976,
and Schiﬀer 1977.)
So there really seems to be no motivation even for the weak view
that some sort of causal relation provides at least one way of thinking
about objects of which the speaker is neither directly nor perceptually
aware.11
10 The above paragraph was written in response to a good question asked by Daniel
Yeakel.
11 Another initially plausible suggestion as to why in Sleigh’s and other similar cases
the thinker’s possession of information that the F exists is insuﬃcient to provide
the ability to think about the F, is that in all these cases, the thinker fails to know
who the F is (when the F is a person), or fails to know what the F is (when the F is
a non-person). (Hintikka 1962 made this suggestion.) However, the apparent fact,
persuasively pointed out by (Boo¨r and Lycan 1975), that knowing-who is purpose
relative makes this condition unsuitable as a necessary condition for having
thoughts about objects. For it seems clear that one’s having a thought about an
object is not purpose-relative at all.
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3. Reference-Fixing by Description
Given the falsity of the Fregean view, and given the fact that no causal
relation provides a relevant necessary condition for having thoughts
about objects, my view has been that the minimal condition that needs
to be added to the fact that an agent assumes correctly that just one
object is F, in order to guarantee that the agent has a thought or other
cognitive attitude that is about the F, is the condition that the agent’s
thought or other attitude must involve a mental act of reference that is
based on the agent’s (true) assumption that there is just one F. (See
McKinsey 1986, 1994.) My explanation of the nature of this kind of
mental act is in turn based on an important semantic idea that was ﬁrst
adequately described by Kripke (1972). This is the idea that a proper
name or other type of genuine term can have its referent ﬁxed, or
determined, by a given deﬁnite description, without making the
relevant term synonymous with the description.12
Kripke gave several nice examples of reference-ﬁxing by description,
but one of the best is that of the planet Neptune, whose existence was
discovered solely on the basis of mathematical calculations that in turn
were based on observed perturbations in the orbit of Uranus (Kripke
1972, p. 347, n. 33). One of Neptune’s discoverers was the French
astronomer Leverrier,13 who might well have given the planet the name
‘Neptune’ by means of description, as follows:
(8) Let ‘Neptune’ refer to an object x (at any possible world w) if
and only if x = the planet that causes Y-perturbations in the
orbit of Uranus (in the actual world).
As the parenthetical remarks indicate, Kripke suggested that Leverrier
might have introduced ‘Neptune’ as a ‘‘rigid designator’’ that refers to
the same object at every possible world, where this object is to be
the planet that causes Y-perturbations in Uranus’ orbit in this world
12 Jeshion (2002) has recently defended the idea that reference-ﬁxing by description
can provide the basis for de re thoughts. While I ﬁnd Jeshion’s view congenial in
many respects, her view, unlike mine, requires the use of names in thought to
explain how de re thoughts can be based on description. Jeshion’s view also implies
that once a (mental) name’s reference is ﬁxed by description, a thought involving
that name can be about an object which the thinker can no longer correctly
describe. I disagree with this aspect of Jeshion’s view, though the issue is diﬃcult.
Jeshion’s idea of mental names whose reference can be ﬁxed by either ostension or
description is quite similar to Pollock’s concept of a ‘‘de re representation.’’ See
Pollock 1980 and 1982, Chapter III.
13 The other was the British astronomer John Couch Adams in 1845, slightly before
Leverrier’s discovery in 1846. Using information from Leverrier, Neptune was ﬁrst
observed by telescope later in 1846. (Microsoft Encarta Encyclopedia, 1999.)
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(the actual world). Being a rigid designator, ‘Neptune’ would thus not
be synonymous with the description that ﬁxes its referent, since that
description is not a rigid designator. Given that ‘Neptune’ is rigid, even
the following sentence would express only a contingent truth:14
(9) Neptune causes Y-perturbations in the orbit of Uranus.
My own view is that (9) and other sentences containing ‘Neptune’
would express singular propositions about Neptune. Thus, even though
‘Neptune’ is introduced by means of description, it is not a description
itself; rather it is a genuine term whose sole function is to introduce its
referent (the planet) into propositions expressed by use of sentences
containing the name. Thus the descriptive content used to ﬁx the
name’s referent does not ‘‘get into’’ the propositions expressed by use
of the name.
While Kripke’s examples convinced many that reference-ﬁxing of
names by description is certainly possible, most were also convinced by
Kripke’s and Donnellan’s arguments that in general, names’ referents
are not determined or ﬁxed by description (Donnellan 1970, Kripke
1972). As a result, I think, the idea of reference-ﬁxing by description
was not considered to be of much importance in the philosophy of lan-
guage. But as I mentioned above, I showed that Kripke’s and Donne-
llan’s arguments failed to establish that name’s referents are typically
not determined by description. I have also defended semantic theories
of names, indexical pronouns, and natural kind terms on which the
semantic referents of these terms are invariably ﬁxed or determined by
description, and these theories ﬁt all the existing linguistic and intuitive
data. (See McKinsey 1978a, 1978b, 1984, 1987 and forthcoming.) So in
my view, reference-ﬁxing by description is a widespread and fundamen-
tal semantic mechanism.
4. Mental Anaphora and Its Implications
One of the most important applications of the idea of reference-
ﬁxing by description is its use in explaining how an analogous phe-
nomenon can occur at the level of thought. I call this phenomenon
mental anaphora (McKinsey 1986). Consider the following cognitive
ascription:
14 Kripke also claimed that, given the introduction of ‘Neptune’ via (8), (9) would be
knowable a priori even though it is contingent. Donnellan (1977) persuasively criti-
cized Kripke’s striking claim. I agree with Donnellan that the proposition expressed
by (9) cannot be known a priori, but for reasons diﬀerent from his.
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(10) Oscar wishes he had caught the ﬁsh that got away.
It’s clear that on one of its readings, (10) can be true even though no
ﬁsh actually got away from Oscar (he had a branch or old boot on
the end of his line). It’s also clear that on this same reading, the wish
ascribed to Oscar by (10) would be consistent. To capture this read-
ing, I’ve proposed that we follow a suggestion made by Geach (1967)
for understanding similar cases, and write the relevant reading as
follows:
(11) Oscar assumes that just one ﬁsh got away, and Oscar wishes it
had been the case that he caught it (that very ﬁsh).
According to my earlier arguments, the second occurrence of the pro-
noun ‘it’ in (11) is neither a bound variable nor going proxy for a
description. Rather, the best hypothesis is that ‘it’ is functioning here
as what Evans (1977) called an ‘E-type’ pronoun, a rigid genuine term
whose referent is ﬁxed by the description recoverable from its quantiﬁer
antecedent.
Now suppose that just one ﬁsh did get away from Oscar at t, and
call it ‘Bubbles.’ Since the truth of the singular proposition that Oscar
catches Bubbles at t would make Oscar’s wish come true (at some
other possible world), and since the words ‘he caught it’ in (11)
express this proposition, this singular proposition would be the con-
tent of the wish ascribed by (11). But then, it surely seems that
Oscar’s wish would really be about Bubbles. But this wish would be
about Bubbles merely because Bubbles in fact uniquely satisﬁes the
descriptive assumption on which the mental act involved in Oscar’s
wish is based.
Thus the existence of mental anaphora shows that thoughts can be
about objects, merely by involving mental acts whose referents are ﬁxed
by descriptive assumptions that the objects uniquely satisfy. Since there
are forms of mental anaphora analogous to (11) involving every type
of cognitive attitude, it follows that cognitive attitudes of every type
can be about objects merely by virtue of those objects’ unique satisfac-
tion of certain descriptions.
The existence of mental anaphora provides strong, positive evi-
dence for a quite liberal view regarding the aboutness of thoughts, a
view which we might call the ‘Reference-Fixing Theory of About-
ness.’ Letting ‘C’ stand in for any cognitive attitude verb, the vari-
ous principles that are instances of this theory would all be wriiten
as follows:
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The Reference-Fixing Theory of Aboutness (RFA)
Necessarily, for any person x, object y, and property G, if
there is a property F such that (i) y = the F, and (ii) x
assumes that there is just one F, and x Cs that it (that very F)
is G, then x Cs of or about y that y is G.
Of course, I am assuming here that clause (ii) is an instance of mental
anaphora, so that the pronoun ‘it’ is an E-type pronoun.
Note that while (RFA) is a liberal view, it conforms to to the
requirement suggested by the Russellian diagnosis of the Fregean
view’s mistake. For cognitive states that are about objects because they
ﬁt the model provided by (RFA) must all have singular propositions
about those objects as their contents.
5. Donnellan’s Objection
In the 1970s, one of the very few philosophers who emphasized the
importance of reference-ﬁxing by description, and who as a result
endorsed a liberal view of thought about objects, was Kaplan (1977,
1978). In doing so, Kaplan was explicitly taking back his earlier view
of ‘‘Quantifying In’’ (1969), on which thought about an object required
the thinker to be en rapport with the object. In that paper, Kaplan had
remarked (pp. 228–29):
. . . I am unwilling to adopt any theory of proper names which permits
me to perform a dubbing in absentia, as by solemnly declaring ‘‘I
hereby dub the ﬁrst child to be born in the twenty-second century
‘Newman 1’,’’ and thus grant myself standing to have beliefs about
that as yet unborn child.
But later, as he reports in his paper ‘‘Dthat’’ (1978), Kaplan had
become convinced (perhaps by Kripke’s examples?) that a name’s refer-
ence can be ﬁxed by any description, so that bearing a cognitive atti-
tude toward a singular proposition does not require ‘‘that the person
be en rapport with the subject of the proposition’’ (p. 397). Thus simply
by assertively uttering a sentence like
(12) Newman 1 will be bald,
Kaplan had come to believe, he ‘‘can assert of the ﬁrst child to be
born in the twenty-ﬁrst century that he will be bald . . .’’ (p. 397; his
italics).
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I of course believe that Kaplan was absolutely right to change his
mind.15 But Donnellan immediately (1977) launched a persuasive coun-
terattack on Kaplan’s new liberal view, contending forcefully that one
could not have knowledge or beliefs of the ﬁrst child to be born in the
21st century, merely by virtue of having dubbed the child ‘Newman 1.’
Donnellan imagines that the dubbing is performed (say, in 1975), and
that eventually the ﬁrst child of the 21st century is born and baptised
‘John.’ Donnellan then remarks (p. 20):
Now it seems to me that it would be outrageous to say that some
twenty-ﬁve years or so before his birth, we knew that John would be
the ﬁrst child born in the 21st century. Suppose one of us, living to a
ripe old age, were to meet John after he has grown up a bit. Would it
be true to say to John, ‘‘I call you ‘Newman 1’ and Newman 1, I
knew some twenty-ﬁve years or so before your birth that you would
be the ﬁrst child born in the 21st century’’?
Donnellan is claiming here that it would be just obviously false to say,
for instance,
(13) In 1975, David knew of Newman 1 that he would be the ﬁrst
child born in the 21st century.
Now everyone can agree that (13) certainly seems false. But I want to
argue that (13) at least could be true (in the circumstances).
15 Kaplan has more recently clariﬁed his position. See his ‘‘Afterthoughts’’ (1989),
p. 605 and note 95, pp. 605–606. Here it is clear that Kaplan still believes that one
can ﬁx the reference of a term purely by description, and as a result one can then
assert singular propositions and can be in de dicto cognitive attitudes toward those
singular propositions. But now Kaplan holds that having a de dicto belief, say,
whose content is a singular proposition about an object is not suﬃcient for having
a de re belief that is about that object.
I of course believe that Kaplan was wrong about this, but the issues are diﬃ-
cult, and I can’t do justice to them here. One very counterintuitive feature of Kap-
lan’s new view is that quantiﬁcations into de dicto contexts are no longer to be
understood as equivalent to, nor suﬃcient for, any de re ascription. For example
(i) ($x) (x = Ortcutt & Ralph believes that x is a spy)
must now be counted as insuﬃcient to imply
(ii) ($) (x = Ortcutt & Ralph believes of x that x is a spy).
But it just seems obvious to me that (i) and (ii) are logically equivalent. I would
myself in fact deﬁne both ‘believes-of’ constructions like (ii), as well as ‘believes to
be’ constructions, by use of quantiﬁcation into de dicto contexts. (See McKinsey
1998, pp. 6–7.)
Another problem for Kaplan’s new view is that he apparently must assume that
the de dicto belief operator used in sentences like (i) must have a diﬀerent sense
than the belief operator has in de re constructions like (ii). But I have argued else-
where (1998) that it is both implausible and unnecessary to hold that ‘believes’ is
ambiguous in this way.
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But before considering (13) in detail, it will help to ﬁrst consider a
slightly different sort of case, namely, that of ‘Neptune’ and Leverrier.
It is interesting that Donnellan says of this case exactly what he says
about the ‘Newman 1’ case. He imagines that the Neptunians see and
hear Leverrier perform his act of dubbing, and they know that their
planet is the cause of the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus.
Donnellan then says, ‘‘Would they be justiﬁed in concluding that the
Earthling has learned or come to know that their planet is the cause? It
seems to me that the answer is obviously that they would not’’ (p. 21).
Here, Donnellan is claiming that it would be just obviously false for
someone to say
(14) At t, Leverrier knows of Neptune that it is the planet that
causes Y-perturbations in the orbit of Uranus.
(Where t is the time at which Leverrier dubs the planet ‘Neptune.’) But
is (14) really false? I think that on the contrary, it is fairly easy to see
that (14) is in fact true, and that in the circumstances described,
Donnellan’s intuition that (14) would be false is due solely to the fact
that saying (14) would conversationally implicate in Grice’s sense vari-
ous falsehoods that (14) itself does not logically imply. (See Grice 1961,
1975, 1989.)
At the time of dubbing, all Leverrier had done so far is to discover
that a unique planet causes Y-perturbations in the orbit of Uranus,
and he had decided to call that planet ‘Neptune.’ At this point, it
would certainly sound odd to say (14). It would sound even odder to
say, as Donnellan imagines, that Leverrier has learned, or come to
know, of Neptune that it is the cause of the relevant perturbations. But
the oddity of these ways of speaking is due solely to the fact that they
conversationally implicate the falsehood that, prior to the planet’s dis-
covery, Leverrier already had some other way or ways of independently
identifying Neptune. But as Grice pointed out (1989, p. 44), conversa-
tional implicatures can always be consistently cancelled. Thus it seems
clear that Leverrier would have spoken the truth, had he said right
after the dubbing:
(15) I now do know of Neptune that it is the planet that causes
Y-perturbations in the orbit of Uranus, but in fact that is all
I know about Neptune so far, and the only way I have of
identifying Neptune is that it is the planet that causes Y-per-
turbations in the orbit of Uranus.
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Since (15) is obviously true, and (15) entails (14), (14) is also true,
contrary to Donnellan’s claim. Notice that very shortly later, but
before Neptune is observed through a telescope, Leverrier might learn
or come to know of Neptune (through additional calculations, say) that
it orbits the sun at such-and-such a mean distance, that it is the third
largest in mass of the planets, and so on. At this point it seems per-
fectly natural to say that Leverrier knows these things of Neptune. But
this further knowledge is really just additional information of the same
type as the information that Leverrier had at the outset. This shows
that there is only a difference of degree between the later knowledge of
Neptune and the knowledge that Leverrier had at the outset. So again,
it’s clear that Leverrier was in a position at the outset to have knowl-
edge of Neptune.16
The situation regarding Newman 1 is slightly more complicated. In
the Leverrier case it is entirely natural to suppose that Leverrier would
have introduced a name to refer to his newly discovered planet. But by
contrast, it is exceedingly unnatural to suppose that David (or anyone
else) would ever introduce a name for the ﬁrst child to be born in the
21st century. The difference is that Leverrier had every reason to expect
that large amounts of new information about the newly discovered pla-
net would shortly and constantly be forthcoming, so that a name
would be useful, even necessary, to assert and communicate singular
propositions about the planet, and to allow for the effective organiza-
tion of this information around the object of which the information is
true.
But in the Newman 1 case, by contrast, there is absolutely no pur-
pose that is served (except perhaps to ‘‘confound the sceptics’’17) by
introducing a name for Newman 1, since there is no reason at all to
expect any additional information to be forthcoming about the name’s
referent, and so there is no reason to want to organize this information
centered on the referent and no reason to be interested in asserting,
communicating, knowing, believing, or thinking of singular proposi-
tions about the object in question.
16 My use of a pragmatic Gricean strategy to defend (RFA) owes much to Sosa’s
(1970) use of a similar strategy to defend the Fregean view against Sleigh-type
counterexamples. In a recent illuminating discussion of Donnellan’s argument,
Jeshion (2001) has contended, as I just did, that it’s possible to give a good expla-
nation of Donnellan’s intuitions that is nevertheless consistent with Leverrier’s hav-
ing de re thoughts about Neptune. But Jeshion’s explanation is signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from mine, and does not appeal to Gricean implicature.
17 As Kaplan puts it (1977, p.560, note 76). In this note, Kaplan is making a similar
point to the one I am making here.
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With this in mind, let us again consider the possibility that
(13) In 1975, David knew of Newman 1 that he would be the ﬁrst
child born in the 21st century.
In the absence of any stage-setting, (13) seems false because normally it
would be false. For normally, no one would ever introduce a name for
Newman 1, and certainly, no one would ever bother to get themselves
into the mental states that are required for (13) to be true. So to evalu-
ate my view that (13) could be true in the imagined circumstances, we
have to imagine that various quite abnormal things are also true in the
imagined circumstances. First, we have to suppose that, while this is
highly improbable, it really is true that in 1975, for reasons that are
hard to explain, David actually often did assertively and with knowl-
edge utter the sentence
(16) Newman 1 will be the ﬁrst child born in the 21st century.
Using mental anaphora, we could describe David’s odd state of mind
when he utters (16) as being something like this:
(17) In 1975, David knew that just one child would be born ﬁrst
in the 21st century, and David was then disposed to know-
ingly judge that he or she (that very child) would be the ﬁrst
child born in the 21st century.
By my principle (RFA) plus (17), it follows that (13) is true in the
circumstances.
But now, is it still obvious that (13) is false? I don’t think so. By
describing the circumstances carefully and making clear just how odd
and abnormal the situation really is, we have managed to cancel most
of the implicatures that a normal use of (13) would have, but which in
this case are all false. Thus it is clear that, contrary to what (13) impli-
cates, all David knows of Newman 1 is that he will be the child born
ﬁrst in the 21st century, and it is also clear that David has no other
independent way of identifying Newman 1. Moreover, the assumption
(17) makes clear that while neither having nor expecting any store of
additional information that would give him practical reason to have
singular thoughts about Newman 1, David has nevertheless (perhaps
madly) gone on to have such thoughts anyway.
So I think that these considerations show that (13) at least could be
true in the imagined circumstances, and of course this is all that my
Reference-Fixing Theory (RFA) implies. Notice that the diﬀerence
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between the descriptive knowledge at the basis of (15) in the Leverrier
case and the descriptive knowledge at the basis of (13) in the Newman
1 case, is clearly a diﬀerence of degree, not of kind. Thus there can be
no principled reason to agree that (15) is true in the Leverrier case, as
it obviously is, while rejecting (13) as false in the Newman 1 case. I
suggest that we should think of cases like that of Newman 1 as limiting
cases of having descriptive information that can serve as the basis of
thought about and reference to external objects. It’s true that we would
in fact never use such limited information as the basis of thought or
reference (except perhaps in a philosophical example). But as Kaplan
pointed out, the fact that we would never use descriptive information of
this kind in this way, does not show that we could not do so, if we
wished (1977, p. 560, n. 76).
6. Conclusion
In this paper, I have tried to motivate and defend my view that our
thoughts about ordinary objects in the external world are frequently
based solely on descriptive assumptions. Since my view requires that
the propositional contents of thoughts about objects must be singular
propositions, the view avoids the counterexamples which refute the
Fregean view. It is commonly assumed that, like the Fregean view, my
form of description theory also makes it too easy to have thoughts
about particular objects. However, I have argued that proposals of
stronger conditions, such as the bearing of a causal relation, yield false
views precisely because they are too strong. I gave a positive argument
for my view by providing linguistic evidence for the existence of mental
anaphora, a phenomenon that both illustrates and supports my Refer-
ence-Fixing Theory (RFA). Finally, I defended my view against Don-
nellan’s objection by using a Gricean strategy, on which the intuitions
of Donnellan and others concerning limiting cases like those of Nep-
tune and Newman 1, are based on false but cancellable conversational
implicatures.18
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